This paper documents the size and timing of the world inter-continental trade boom following the great voyages in the 1490s of Columbus, da Gama and their followers. Indeed, a trade boom followed over the subsequent three centuries. But what was its cause? The conventional wisdom in the world history literature offers globalization as the answer: it alleges that declining trade barriers, falling transport costs and overseas "discovery" explains the boom. In contrast, this paper reports the evidence that confirms unambiguously that there was no commodity price convergence between continents, something that would have emerged had globalization been a force that mattered. Thus, the trade boom must have been caused by some combination of European import demand and foreign export supply from Asia and the Americas. Furthermore, the behavior of the relative price of foreign importables in European cities should tell us which mattered most and when. We offer detailed evidence on the relative prices of such importables in European markets over the five centuries1350-1850. We then offer a model which is used to decompose the sources of the trade boom 1500-1800.
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I. Introduction
Why has world trade grown? This fundamental question has been posed recently by such notable international economists as Paul Krugman (1995) and Robert Feenstra (1998) . In Krugman's words: "Most journalistic discussion of the growth of world trade seems to view growing integration as driven by a technological imperative -to believe that improvements in transportation and communication technology constitute an irresistible force dissolving national boundaries" (Krugman 1995, p. 328 ). An alternative explanation might stress instead declining political barriers to trade, which (like technological improvements) help link distant markets together and erase commodity price gaps between them. A third potential explanation seems to have been even more powerful in practice, since it appears that fully two-thirds of the late 20 th century trade boom can be explained by unusually fast income growth (Baier and Bergstrand 2001) .
This modern debate has a powerful historical resonance. Consider another canonical example of world trade growth. The conventional wisdom is that there was a secular world trade boom following the Voyages of Discovery by Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama and their European followers. This paper measures, we believe for the first time, the size and timing of that secular trade boom. Furthermore, and just as in the late 20 th century case discussed by Krugman, there is a conventional historical wisdom which argues that the trade boom after Columbus can be explained by declining trade barriers and/or transport costs between Europe and the overseas continents with whom it traded for "exotic" products, consumed by the elite. This paper rejects this view, and offers instead the model and the evidence necessary to decompose the sources of the trade boom into the demand and supply fundamentals that really mattered.
The next section measures the world trade boom as it was manifested by European imports from, and exports to, both Asia and the Americas. The evidence there shows that the share of trade in GDP has certainly increased over the 500 years since 1492. However, it also documents that some 2 Table 1 computes an unweighted average of the growth rates underlying all series in each half century after 1500, and then cumulates these half-century growth rates to yield 1.06 percent per annum between 1500 and 1800. Alternatively, one can include in the calculation only those series describing European imports from Asia and the Americas, since in the presence of bullion flows European export growth need not have equalled European import growth, and since we will later be appealing to European import demand in our attempt to account for these trade flows. However, the two calculations yield much the same result: 1.06 versus 0.97 percent per annum. See also footnote 3. 3 We also calculated trade growth rates excluding all nominal series on the premise that it's the volume of trade to be explained, not the value. If prices were falling, the 1.1 percent growth rate would understate trade volume growth, while the reverse would be true if prices were rising. Excluding all the nominal series in Table 1 lowers trade growth from 0.66 to 0.11 percent per annum 3 Table 1 documents the world trade boom between 1500 and 1992. The evidence summarized there takes many forms, and it is never quite what we'd like: sometimes reporting trade in value, sometimes in quantity; sometimes for one product, sometimes for another; sometimes carried by one country, sometimes another; and never, at least until 1800 and Angus Maddison (1995) , a constant price world trade index. Still, the regional, product, and country coverage is enormous. And, in any case, it's all that the archives have yielded thus far.
II. The Trade Boom After Columbus
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[ Table 1 about here]
The panel at the bottom of Table 1 reports two notable facts. First, the growth of world trade was pretty much the same in the 19 th and 20 th centuries, roughly 3.5 percent per annum. This is a surprising fact, given that world GDP growth doubled from 1.5 to 3 percent per annum between 1820 -1913 and 1913 -1992 (Maddison 1995 . Since the growth of world trade was almost identical in the two centuries, it follows that trade shares rose much faster in the 19 th than the 20 th century. So far, it looks like the 19 th century is the canonical globalization epoch, not the 20 th century. Second, trade growth prior to 1800 was much slower, about 1.1 percent per annum. Of course, everything else grew more slowly in this pre-industrial period too, so a 1.1 percent per annum growth rate may still be fast enough to ensure that trade shares were on the increase in the wake of da Gama and Columbus. 3 in the 17 th century, a big decline. In the 18 th century, excluding the nominal series lowers growth from 1.26 to 0.9 percent per annum. Overall, excluding the nominal series lowers growth over the three centuries from 1.06 to 0.76 percent per annum. These differences are big enough to suggest that we use both -thus establishing upper and lower bounds -when, in Section V, we decompose the sources of the trade boom. 4 The share falls in 1780 before recovering to that all-time high in 1801 (Crafts 1985, The most obvious explanation for the global trade boom is that it was caused by declining transport costs and/or some fall in man-made barriers to trade. Such a view seems to us implicit in a recent statement by Andre Gunder Frank that "there was a single global world economy with a worldwide division of labour and multilateral trade from 1500 onward" (Frank 1998, p. 52 ). This position is shared by several prominent world historians. Jerry Bentley views the period after 1500 as "a genuinely global epoch of world history" (Bentley 1996, pp. 768-9) . Immanuel Wallerstein believes that by the sixteenth century a European "world-economy based upon the capitalist mode of production" had appeared (Wallerstein 1974, p. 67) . These historians are on the side of Adam Smith who believed that "the discovery of America and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind" (Smith 1776: 6 th ed., 1791, Vol. II, Chp. VII, Pt. III, p. 139).
5 One revealing indicator is to look for entries under "prices" in the subject index of wellknown world history texts. Here are some partial results: Abu-Lughod (1989), none; Prakesh (1998), none; McNeill (1999) , one to "price revolution"; Curtin (1984) , two, one on "administered prices" and another to "price fixing"; and Chaudhuri (1982) , none. The examples could be multiplied. 6 In fairness to the world historians, however, their reliance on quantity data has distinguished allies. For example, Robert Feenstra (1998) , the economist, leans heavily on such data in his discussion of the growing integration of 20 th century international commodity markets.
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If this world history pro-globalization hypothesis is correct, then we should be able to document commodity price convergence between Europe, Asia and the Americas over the three centuries. If we cannot document commodity price convergence, then the pro-globalization hypothesis must be rejected and we will have to search for other explanations of the trade boom.
Definitions matter, of course. Although it is commodity price convergence that matters for the integration of international commodity markets, and which to us signals globalization as it affects international trade, historians rarely look for evidence of such convergence or its absence. 5 They tend instead to look at quantity data, such as trade volumes, or qualitative information, such as the rise and fall of trade routes. 6 For globalization as we define it to have an independent influence on an economy, trade-creating forces must change domestic commodity prices: it is these changes in domestic commodity prices which trigger changes in such variables as the distribution of income (e.g., land rents relative to wages), absolute living standards or the quality of life.
Where, then, should we look for evidence of globalization as we define it? Initially, only goods with very high value to bulk ratios were shipped, like silk, exotic spices and precious metals. Indeed, long distance trade in the pre-18 th century period was strictly limited to what might be called noncompeting goods: Europe imported spices, silk, sugar and gold, which were not found there at all, or were in very scarce supply; Asia imported silver, linens and woolens, which were not found there at all (with the important exception of Japanese silver before 1668). Dutch exports of precious metals to Asia accounted for between a half and two-thirds of the value of Asian products imported into Europe by the Dutch East India Company (hereafter, VOC: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, established 7 Findlay (1996, pp. 53-4 (Steensgaard 1965, p. 148) . A half century later, the freight costs on English chartered ships had fallen to £16-23, or by 23-50 percent (Steensgaard 1965, Table 1, p. 152) , an impressive decline on the face of it. However, it turns out that the source of the decline was a fall in the turnaround time in Southeast Asia (Steensgaard 1965, p. 154) . Prior to 1640, ships were required to spend time putting down local revolts in Asian waters, building forts, negotiating agreements, showing the flag, and fending off European 8 We say "most" but do not assert "all." Presumably, the VOC saved on costs by switching to a permanent Asian fleet. In Steengaard's words, "The extra expense involved in setting up this permanent Asian trading fleet must have been slight compared with the saving achieved by employing the big return ships solely for the purpose for which they were intended" (Steengaard 1965, p. 156) . 7 competitors. After 1640, chartered ships did not perform these functions, but rather a permanent Asian fleet of smaller VOC ships did. The cost per ton per trip does not include the cost of the permanent fleet, borne by the East India Company as before, but not directly included as part of the charter cost per ton. When these costs are added back in, our guess is that most of the decline in transport costs over the half century would evaporate.
8 Ralph Davis (1962, pp. 262-4) and Bal Krishna (1924, pp. 321-3) extend the freight cost evidence from the 1650s to the 1730s. They find that freight costs "were higher in the 1720s and 1730s than they had been in the 1660s and 1670s and they took another step upward in the 1760s, when they return to the levels prevailing in the early seventeenth century" (Menard 1991, p. 250 What about commodity price convergence? We have the required price data for spices and coffee, items which combined were 68 percent of Dutch homeward cargoes in the mid-17 th century (Reid 1993, pp. 288-9) . Figure 1 plots markups for cloves, pepper and coffee (Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and Wu 1998) , where markups are defined as the ratio of European to Asian price. There is plenty of evidence of price convergence for cloves from the 1590s to the 1640s, but it was short-lived, since the spread soared to a 350-year high in the 1660s, maintaining that high level during the VOC monopoly and up to the 1770s. The clove price spread fell steeply at the end of the French Wars, and by the 1820s was one-fourteenth of the 1730s level. This low spread was maintained across the 19 th century.
Between the 1620s and the 1730s, the pepper price spread showed no trend, after which, however, it 9 A reading of Douglas Irwin (1991 Irwin ( , esp. p. 1297 suggests that pretty much all of the intercontinental trade at this time was by state-chartered monopolies. Like most monopolies, they raised prices paid by consumers (in Europe), lowered prices paid by suppliers (in Asia), restricted output and limited trade. This is hardly the stuff that globalization is made of! 8 soared to a 250-year high in the 1790s. By the 1820s, the pepper price spread of the early 17 th century was recovered, and price convergence continued up to the 1880s, when the series ends. While there is some modest evidence of price convergence for coffee during the half century between the 1730s and the 1780s, everything gained was lost and more during the French Wars. At the war's end, price convergence resumed, so that the coffee price spread in the 1850s was one-sixth of what it had been in the 1750s, and in the 1930s it was one-thirteenth of what it had been in the 1730s. Thus, there is absolutely no evidence of commodity price convergence for these "exotic" goods so central to Dutch [ Figure 1 about here]
Of course, the price spread on pepper, cloves, coffee, tea and other non-competing goods was not driven solely, or even mainly, by the costs of shipping, but rather, and most importantly, by monopoly, 9 international conflict, and government tariff and non-tariff restrictions. But we are indifferent about the sources of commodity price convergence: anything that impedes price convergence suppresses trade, and there is no evidence of secular commodity price convergence before the 1820s.
Is there any reason to expect the price spread on competing goods between Europe and Asia to have behaved differently, as opposed to the non-competing "exotics" we have just examined? We think it unlikely, especially if we cannot find it for the important East Indian cloth trade. Figure 2 plots the average prices received by the East India Company on its Asian textile sales in Europe, divided by the average prices it paid for those textiles in Asia. Again, there is no sign of a secular decline in mark-ups (where mark-ups include all trade costs, as well as any East India Company monopoly 10 All import price data come from Chaudhuri's (1978) Table C .24, which also provides data on sales prices and mark-ups from 1664 to 1704. From 1710 to 1759, the sales prices used are those given in Chaudhuri's Table A.13 (p. 302) ; like the earlier data in Table C .24, these are average prices, but since they are listed in a separate table, we cannot be sure that they are strictly comparable with those earlier figures. 9 profits) over the century between 1664 and 1759.
10 This textile trade was extremely large and it was on the rise. Yet, the evidence on freight rates and mark-ups suggest that growing trade volumes in the late 17 th century were almost certainly driven by the outward expansion of European import demand or Asian export supply rather than by world commodity market integration per se. If it was globalization at work, we would see evidence of commodity price convergence and there is none.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The evolution of transport costs in the North Atlantic prior to the early 19 th century is summarized by Russell Menard (1991) , and his freight cost indices offer no unambiguous support for pre-18 th century globalization either (although his interest is in transport revolutions, and his evidence is thus limited to freight rates rather than commodity price gaps). The best case for a North Atlantic pre- , Table 6 .6, p. 264) documents stability in the peacetime real freight charges on sugar between the 1650s and the 1760s, and thus no support for globalization in the North Atlantic prior to the 19 th century. The rice trade also shows no fall in real freight rates between the 1690s and the 1760s. However, freight rates did undergo an impressive decline after the 1760s (Menard 1991, Table 6 .8, pp. 268-9), but there is reason to believe that this late 18 th century 11 The argument for overstatement is given in O' Rourke and Williamson (2000b) , but it goes something like this: Menard (1991 , Table 6 .6, p. 264) documents stability in the peacetime real freight charges on sugar between the 1650s and the 1760s, deflating the nominal charges by the BrownHopkins (1981) consumer price index (CPI) in England. But if sugar prices in Barbados and Jamaica fell by more than did the CPI in England, the rise in Menard's real freight rate index would be understated and its fall overstated. Apparently sugar prices did fall by more (Mechner 1999, Figure 2.2, p. 58a; McCusker and Menard 1991, Figure 7.1, p. 158) . The North Atlantic rice trade also shows a fall in real freight rates after the 1760s, but, once again, if rice prices in Charleston fell by more than did the CPI in England, then this late 18 th century decline in freight rates is overstated.
10 decline in freight rates is overstated, 11 and, in any case, it would have been greatly offset by rising insurance charges in the more hostile world of the French Wars.
There is plenty of evidence of an inter-continental trade boom during the Age of Commerce, but there is very little evidence of commodity price convergence between the continents.
IV. Demand and Supply: Decomposing the Sources of the Trade Boom Background
Before we bring some more empirical evidence to bear on what in the traditional literature has been largely a qualitative discussion about the economic impact of the Voyages of Discovery, we need, once again, to define terms. Obviously, we take globalization to mean the integration of commodity markets between continents. The Voyages of Discovery also involved a transfer of technology, plants, animals and diseases on an enormous scale, never seen before or since; but this is not the focus of the present paper. Furthermore, the economic potential of the Voyages of Discovery could never have been fully realized without the peopling of these frontiers and the investment of European capital in them; thus, it also involved factor markets. More to the point of this paper, the inter-continental trade boom that followed the voyages of Columbus and da Gama must have had its source in some combination of three factors: a boom in European demand for tradables (the continent that was pulling away economically from the Rest), a boom in tradable supply from the Rest, and a 12 Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1996) have used Angus Maddison's data (e.g. Maddison 1991 Maddison , 1995 to trace out long-run trends in commodity market integration since the early 19 th century, and historians of pre-industrial experience also use such evidence. However, Figure 3 makes it clear that globalization is not the only reason why the volume of trade, or trade's share in GDP, might increase over time. Outward shifts in either import demand (to MM') or export supply (to SS') could also lead to trade expansion, and such shifts could occur as a result of population growth, the colonization of empty lands, capital accumulation, technological change, and a variety of other factors.
Alternatively, globalization could coincide with falling trade volumes if MM or SS were shifting inwards over time. Thus, the only irrefutable evidence that globalization is taking place, on our definition, is a decline in the international dispersion of commodity prices or what we will call commodity price convergence. However, we were not able to find it in Section III.
We represent the post-1492 trade boom documented in Section II as a rise from T 0 to T 1 , T 2 or T 3 . If t remained constant (no move toward more global integration), then outward shifts in either MM or SS, but not both, would generate a trade boom to T 1 (where the price gap, t, remains the same, although prices change in both markets). An outward shift in both MM and SS would generate a bigger trade boom to T 2 (still holding t constant). If at the same time t evaporated (global integration), we would observe an even bigger trade boom to T 3 . Figure 3 is translated into an explicit "sources-oftrade" equation and estimated in Section V, where the observed trade boom is actually decomposed into the component parts associated with shifts in European demand and Asian supply.
Relative Price Trends
Figure 3 makes it clear that the behavior of the relative prices of spices, silk, tea, sugar and the many other 'exotic' commodities imported by Europe from overseas should tell us whether it was mainly supply or mainly demand which accounted for the global trade boom from 1500 to 1800.
Appendix 1 reports in detail how we calculated trends in the prices of these "exotic" European 13 These scholars also took great care with weights, measures and quality. These commodities are as close to being homogenous over these centuries as the most demanding economist would wish.
14 Indeed, Appendix Table 1 shows that all we've got for 1450-1500 is Posthumus on pepper and ginger, and, even though ginger dominates, prices of the two move in opposite directions! If pepper is what was really motivating da Gama, then an account which emphasises rising relative prices prompting greater investment in exploration becomes more plausible. Ginger tells the opposite story, and Posthumus cannot offer any other exotic non-competing import prices to resolve the conflict. Thankfully, the data get much thicker after 1550.
13 imports relative to a commodity that didn't travel very far in those times, grain (wheat, oats or barley, depending on the source used). The evidence is very rich, and the sources well known, which is surprising given that, as far as we know, they have never been used for this purpose. Three famous scholars from a previous generation have left behind an amazing data base describing prices for the three main European participants in the overseas trade: Earl Hamilton on Spain (Hamilton 1934 (Hamilton , 1936 (Hamilton , 1947 ; Nicolaas Posthumus on the Netherlands (Posthumus 1946) ; and William Beveridge on England (Beveridge 1939) . These scholars documented (in most cases, annually) the prices of spices, sugar, incense, indigo, tobacco, opium, coffee, tea, and other non-competing importables from Asia and the New World, as they prevailed in major European cities like Amsterdam, London and Seville. 13 We have used these data to calculate trends in the relative price of non-competing importables in every half-century between 1350 and 1850. The findings are summarized in Table 2 , where they are reported separately for imports from Asia and imports from the Americas, as well as the total.
[ Table 2 about here]
The following seven relative price facts emerge from Table 2 . First, it was not some spectacular boom in the relative price of imported "exotic" products -bloating trading profits to even higher levels --that sent Columbus and da Gama off to seek them. that were doing all the work during that century, and thus it was Asian supply, not supply from the Americas, that mattered. The same inverse correlation was present in the 17 th century, but in this case th century depend entirely on just one sugar price series, so we must be cautious about this finding for that century. However, the 17 th century is much more richly documented for the Americas, and the price observations are certainly not limited to sugar. See Appendix Table 1. 15 while the relative price of imports from Asia rose, it fell for those from the Americas.
15 These apparent differences between Asian and American supply are striking, and we will make use of them in Section VI. Seventh and finally, over the three centuries as a whole, the relative price of these import goods declined, suggesting that on average overseas supply-side forces were dominant.
However, it was Asian goods whose relative price fell in European markets over the three centuries, not the relative price of goods from the Americas.
Measuring European Import Demand
Section V will put some meat on the bare bones just exposed by the movements in the relative price of non-competing imports. But since those price trends suggest that European import demand mattered at various points over the five centuries between 1350 and 1850, we next offer a measure of the growth in that part of European income that generated the demand. Appendix 2 supplies the details, so here we just offer a summary.
We begin with the premise that the vast majority of the "exotic" imports from Asia and the Americas were out of the reach of any but the rich: changing living standards of the workers in cities and villages would have had only a trivial impact on European import demand; changing incomes of those at or near the top of the income pyramid would have had a big impact. The rich consisted mainly of landowners, urban merchants, and those in the "residual" class serving the rich and controlling the poor. Given this premise, we estimate the growth of the European "surplus" by half-century between 1500 and 1850, relying on estimates of the growth in English land rents (documented by Gregory Clark 
rents over the full three centuries, the latter are better documented within centuries so we rely on them in what follows. The results are summarized in Table 3 , and they suggest the following:
European surplus income fell in the 16 th century, so it could not have contributed anything to the trade boom; surplus income grew fairly vigorously in the 17 th and 18 th centuries, when its contribution to the trade boom must have been much more important; and surplus income boomed in the 19 th century, when it must have contributed very importantly to the trade boom. We will use this evidence in the next section to implement the trade boom decomposition.
[ Table 3 about here]
V. Accounting for the Trade Boom After Columbus
Europe's external trade boomed in the three centuries following 1500, but the evidence reviewed in Section III suggests that the combined effect of changing trade barriers, trade monopolies, and transport costs cannot account for the boom since there is no evidence of global commodity price convergence before the 19 th century. We have already proposed other explanations for the trade boom. Now we will go one step further and actually decompose the boom into that portion explained by shifting European demand and that portion explained by shifting Asian (and American) supply.
16
The decomposition is implemented by the following simple partial equilibrium relationship:
where D and D * are demand in Europe and Asia respectively, and S * represents Asian supply. Equation (1) reflects the plausible assumption that these Asian goods are non-competing; that is, D dp D dY S dp S dX D dp D dY
goods such as spices and pepper were produced in Asia but not in Europe. The Asian price is given by p, and the European price is p+t, where t is the price gap between the two continents (reflecting the combined effects of freight costs, trade monopoly mark-ups, and government policy). X is a shift factor, reflecting the combined effects on Asian supply of population growth, technological change and so forth. Y and Y * are European and Asian income respectively, where, as we documented in Section IV, "income" refers to the surplus above subsistence received by the rich.
Totally differentiating (1), and assuming that the large t does not change, 17 yields:
while further manipulation yields:
where E p and E Y represent price and income elasticities of European demand respectively, the same demand elasticities in Asia are denoted with a star, a '^' over a variable denotes the proportional rate of change, and E S p and E S X are the Asian supply elasticities with respect to price and the shift factor respectively. Q is the total output of these Asian trade goods (i.e. total Asian supply), while M is the total trade in the goods (i.e. total European demand).
From equation (3) we can derive the following expression for the rate of change in prices:
18 Prices are endogenous, of course. As we have argued, "income" refers to the surplus above subsistence and thus belonged only to the fortunate few who received those incomes.
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( )
Thus, the change in prices is a positive function of incomes on both continents, and a negative function of supply shifts in Asia, as expected.
Finally, we want to account for the European trade boom, here written as the growth in imports,
We can substitute (4) into the right-hand side of equation ( Asian supply (the closer Europe is to being a price-taker), the smaller will be the price increase associated with the European demand expansion, and the smaller will be the price offset associated with that expansion.
Section II supplies the data needed to document the growth of trade. Section IV supplies the data needed to document the growth of the relative price of Asian imports and of European "surplus"
incomes of the rich. In order to estimate the effect of income growth on trade, we also need estimates of the elasticities embedded in the model, particularly European income and price elasticities of demand. We derive these elasticities from equation (5), which expresses trade growth as a function of European price changes and European income growth. Table 4 summarizes the results.
[ Table 4 about here]
Abstracting from changes in taste, all of these data and elasticities should be jointly consistent with equation (5). Focussing on the first two centuries and on the trade data in column (1), it should be the case, for example, that and which allows us to solve for the two unknown elasticities, E p and E Y . The four rows in Table 4 yield six pairs of simultaneous equations, and hence six solutions, for these two variables. These estimates seem to fall within a remarkably tight range, and the implied price elasticities do not seem to be very sensitive to which trade data are used. Income elasticities, however, are more sensitive to the trade data used: the "volume only" trade data imply a much lower elasticity (1.3) than the "total" trade data (2.22), and thus income growth will imply less trade growth using the former calculations. On the other hand, the trade growth to be explained is lower in column (2) than in column
(1).
The last four columns of Table 4 use equation (6), under various assumptions, to calculate the share of total trade growth explained by the growth in Europe's surplus income. Columns (5) and (6) use the trade data in column (1), and the associated elasticities, while columns (7) and (8) use the trade data in column (2) and the elasticities implied by those. We assume that Asian and European demand elasticities were identical, that Asian supply elasticities were one, and that the ratio of Asian output to European demand, Q/M, was either 100 or 10 (i.e. that Europe took somewhere between 1 and 10 percent of the output of these traded goods, a wide range that reflects the absence of even a guess about these magnitudes in the traditional literature). 
VI. Speculations and an Agenda Did Chinese Autarkic Policy Crowd in Europe?
The 'world' we have been talking about so far excludes China. This is a very big part of the pre-industrial world to exclude, perhaps representing as much as a quarter of global GDP at that time. 21 The exclusion, however, is consistent with the way this literature is written, since it is well The emperor Yung-lo ... had found the imported goods ... horses, copper, timber, hides, drugs, spices, gold, silver, even rice ... to be well worth acquiring. He had sent in return, besides a certain quantity of silk, ceramics and tea. ... In addition, private trade was growing.
But the last great Chinese fleet was sent abroad in 1433, and soon afterwards private maritime trade was declared illegal. While the resumption of the imperial voyages was proposed in 1480, the idea was crushed and by 1553 the art of building large ships had been forgotten (Jones 1981, pp. 203-5) .
Although the reasons for the spectacular policy switch are still being debated by specialists, we do 22 There was a China trade in precious metals, but apparently very little else (see, for example, von Glahn 1996). 23 By the phrase "rest of Asia," we mean South and Southeast Asia. After all, China's deglobalization move into autarky was shared, with a lag, by Korea (the Hermit Kingdom) and Japan, the latter persuaded by American gunboats to open up to trade in 1858 after about two centuries of isolation. The speculation about a Chinese policy dog wagging a European tail is, of course, consistent
with Table 4 where we show that European demand played no role in accounting for the trade boom in the 16 th century, and that (non-Chinese) Asian supply accounted for all of it. Furthermore, recall the message from Table 2 which documents a fall in the relative price of non-competing importables in
European markets in the 16 th century, but only for Asian goods, not for those from the Americas.
These relative price facts and the sources-of-trade-boom accounting for 1500-1800 are also consistent with the view that China crowded in European trade with the rest of Asia over the three centuries following da Gama. Of course, these relative price and trade boom accounting facts are not proof of the Chinese-retreat-crowded-in-Europe speculation, but they are certainly consistent with it.
A European Population and Trade Boom Connection?
European "surplus" income growth accounted for none of the trade boom in the 16 th century, all of it in 17 th century, and about two-thirds of it in the 18 th century. What determined growth of this economic surplus? According to one characterization in Appendix 2 (assumption A), the surplus consisted solely of land rents. Since land acreage changed only very slowly, or not at all, in England, France, the Lowlands and the rest of western Europe, the real surplus must have grown at about the same rate as did real rents per acre. In the 16 th and 17 th centuries, total factor productivity growth was very slow in European agriculture (even in English agriculture: Allen 1992), so land rents must have been driven primarily by land/labor ratios -periods of rising population pressure on the land being periods of rapid increase in the ratio of land rents to the wages of landless laborers, as well as, more importantly, periods of rising land rents by themselves. This is the connection for which the classical model was developed, and, with the exception of one paradoxical episode, the evidence from England confirms it.
Elsewhere, we have shown just how tight the English correlation was between the wage-24 Rents rose relative to wages, but rents themselves fell, and it's the latter which is central to the argument here. Table 3 ). Appendix Table 2 also shows how pressure on the land between 1600 and 1850 not only lowered the wagerental ratio but also raised deflated land rents. Thus, European population pressure on the land must have contributed mightily to the trade boom after 1600, and the mechanism was from decreasing landlabor ratio, to increasing land rents, to increasing economic surplus, and to demand for "exotic" imports from Asia and the Americas.
The 16 th century is, however, a paradox. While English 16 th century population pressure on the land was as large or even larger than it was in the subsequent two centuries, rents per acre fell (Appendix Table 2 ). 24 Thus, any Malthusian explanation of the trade boom after Columbus will have to be enriched to account for this paradoxical century.
An Asian Population and Trade Boom Connection?
Of course, if Malthusian forces in Europe were a major force contributing to the trade boom, Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and Wu (1998); Chaudhuri (1978) ; Deane and Cole (1967) : Fisher (1939/40); Glamann (1974) ; Maddison (1995) ; Phillips (1990) ; Steensgaard (1990) ; Truxes (1988) ; U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) . Methods : Some of the within half-century series were shorter than 50 years, but we used them anyway as long as the route/type time series in question covered more than 25 years. We often had to interpolate between benchmark dates, but the vast majority of the half century average per annum rates reported above are calculated from an estimated equation where route/type figures have been regressed on time and time squared for the half century in question. The half century averages are unweighted. Table 2 , using assumption C. (1): per annum rate of growth of trade, using all entries in Table 1 (2): per annum rate of growth of trade, using the volume entries in Table 1 (3): per annum rate of change of relative prices, from Table 2 (4): per annum rate of growth of European surplus income, from Table 3 (or Appendix Table 2 ) (5): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (1), and Q/M = 100 (6): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (1), and Q/M = 10 (7): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (2), and Q/M = 100 (8): share of trade growth explained by income growth, assuming trade growth in (2), and Q/M = 10
